A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | CH | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
| Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region | |
|---|---|
.svg) | |
| Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China | |
| Territorial extent | Worldwide (see Extraterritoriality) |
| Passed by | Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China |
| Passed | 30 June 2020 |
| Signed by | President Xi Jinping |
| Signed | 30 June 2020 |
| Commenced | 30 June 2020 |
| Effective | 30 June 2020 |
| Legislative history | |
| Introduced by | Council of Chairpersons |
| First reading | 18–20 June 2020 |
| Second reading | 28–30 June 2020 |
| Voting summary |
|
| Status: In force | |
| 2020 Hong Kong national security law | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 香港國家安全法 | ||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 香港国家安全法 | ||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||
| Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region | |||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法 | ||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 中华人民共和国香港特别行政区维护国家安全法 | ||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||
 |
|
Politics and government of Hong Kong |
Related topics  Hong Kong portal |
The Hong Kong national security law, officially the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a national law of China on Hong Kong national security passed in 2020.[1] It is implemented in Hong Kong in accordance with Hong Kong Basic Law Article 18, which allows for Chinese laws to be valid in Hong Kong if they are included in Annex III. It was formulated under the authorization of the National People's Congress decision on Hong Kong national security legislation. The law was passed on 30 June 2020 by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress as a means of resolving the anti-extradition bill protests instigated by a Hong Kong local bill proposed in 2019 to enable extradition to other territories including the mainland, and came into force the same day.[2][3]
Among others, the national security law established four particular crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign organisations;[2][4][5] any open speech, verbal promotion or intention of Hong Kong's secession from China is considered a crime as well.[6] The implementation of the law entitles authorities to surveil, detain, and search persons suspected under its provisions and to require publishers, hosting services, and internet service providers to block, remove, or restrict content which the authorities determine to be in violation thereof.[7][8] The law established an office outside of Hong Kong jurisdiction to administer enforcement of the law.[9]
Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which came into force with the British handover of Hong Kong in 1997, requires that a national security law with some of these provisions be enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Before the 2019–2020 protests and passage of the law, a 2003 attempt by the Hong Kong Legislative Council to satisfy Article 23 failed after mass demonstrations. Both the 2003 attempt at and the 2020 passage of legislation occurred during outbreaks of a novel coronavirus (SARS and COVID-19, respectively), which affected the actions of both protesters and authorities.
The United Kingdom and 26 other countries, mostly in the West, as well as Japan, condemned the national security law; the United Kingdom called it a breach of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which provided autonomy for Hong Kong to be retained for 50 years.[10] The imposition of the national security law move prompted measures to put forward relaxed immigration laws for Hong Kong migrants by countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The controversial law has also garnered particular attention to its Article 38, which states that the law is applicable also to those who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong, and to those who do not reside there; the provision has been interpreted by some as saying that it is applicable to every individual in the world.[11]
Background
Article 23 of Hong Kong's Basic Law states that Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will "enact laws on its own" for the Region's security and to prevent political bodies outside the Region from "conducting political activities in the Region" or otherwise interfering with Hong Kong's independent security:[12]
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organisations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or bodies.
A national security law would relate to three ordinances that make up Hong Kong's penal law, the Official Secrets Ordinance, Crimes Ordinance and Societies Ordinance.[13][14] The Societies Ordinance in particular covers elements of security, as it was intended to prevent the creation of criminal secret societies and triads. In 1949, with the influx of migrants from China, it was reintroduced and amended to specifically mention "foreign political organisations".[13] The Crimes Ordinance covers the handling of dissent within the region. In place since 1971, and never amended, the ordinance sets a legal standard allowing people to be imprisoned simply for handling material deemed to be against the government, without need for evidence.[15]
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights ensures freedom of speech, but Hong Kong barrister Wilson Leung has said that China may find a way to override this in legislation they introduce. Leung cites the fact a law imposed by China would be considered national law – while the Hong Kong Bill of Rights is "local" and so would be deemed subordinate by Beijing – and that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) is the highest authority on interpreting the Basic Law, and so could "say that the new security law cannot be restrained by the Bill of Rights" if they want.[16]
National security legislation in Mainland China is controversial outside the country. First implemented in 1993, China's national security law became more restrictive under Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping, who set up a National Security Commission (that he heads himself) shortly after he came to power.[17]
Past legislation attempts
1992–1997
Societies Ordinance
After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, with Hong Kong residents concerned over their civil liberties, the Societies Ordinance was reviewed; it was amended in 1992, relaxing some of the restrictions against being able to register some societies,[18] but this was repealed after the handover in 1997. According to the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (HRM), China amended the ordinance in 1997 "as part of a package of China's effort to emasculate the Hong Kong Bill of Rights".[14] The 1997 amendments include the proviso that should the relevant officials "reasonably believe" that prohibiting a society "is necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others", it can be banned without evidence.[14] HRM said that:
The use of the term "national security" is particularly objectionable because the concept has frequently been used in China to criminalise the peaceful exercise of the rights of expression and to persecute those with legitimate demands like democracy and human rights. Its inclusion raises fears of extension of such Mainland Chinese practices to Hong Kong especially in the light of Article 23 of the Basic Law.
— 1997–98 Memorandum submitted by the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, Appendix 5, paragraph 136[14]
The international response to this 'national security law' was to invoke the Siracusa Principles, which say that national security "cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order", only against outside threats.[14] International jurists declared that including 'national security' in the ordinance dealing with local societies was unwarranted and inappropriate because "it is difficult to suggest that a society or a demonstration in Hong Kong will threaten the existence of China", and any local threat can be handled with normal public order laws.[14] Despite this, the 'national security' ground was introduced. While "national security" was defined as "safeguarding of the territorial integrity and the independence of the People's Republic of China", there was no explanation of what constituted a threat to this, nor how it should be implemented.[14]
Crimes Ordinance
In December 1996, the Hong Kong Legislative Council (as part of the British colonial government) introduced the Crimes (Amendment)(No.2) Bill 1996.[19] The catalyst for introduction was the forthcoming handover, with the initial amendments being mostly technical and removing reference to the monarchy. In turn, it sought proposals to change the articles on treasonable offences.[13] This bill would have amended the Crimes Ordinance, changing sedition legislation that had existed since 1971 and was described by Hong Kong as "archaic".[15] Specifically, the bill proposed legalising dissent of the government, with the council declaring that the existing ordinance " contrary to the development of democracy criminalises speech or writing and may be used as a weapon against legitimate criticism of the government".[15] The bill failed as it was strongly opposed by Beijing, leaving a gap in national security legislation.[19]
A "scaled-down" version of the Crimes Ordinance amendment was pushed through.[15] It gave a more limited definition of "sedition" and increased territorial defences; it was signed by Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten days before the 1997 handover, but was quickly discarded by the Chinese before it could ever come into effect.[15]
2003
.jpg)
In September 2002, the Hong Kong government released its "Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law" Consultation Document. Consultation lasted until December 2002, being concluded early after protests drew tens of thousands of people against the proposal; concessions were made, but the proposals did not return to public consultation.[19] The National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill 2003 was introduced in February 2003, aiming to comply with the requirement under Article 23 that the Hong Kong government should enact national security legislation "on its own". However, the bill was abandoned due to overwhelming opposition, noting the unprecedented number of protesters.[21][22]
The 2003 bill would introduce sedition legislation, as well as offer amendments to the ordinances. While the Region was being encouraged to create legislation in line with the Johannesburg Principles, it did not, and the 2003 provisions would have been more restrictive of civil liberties. The changes were: to narrow the definition of "sedition", requiring someone to deliberately commit acts against the government; to add a 'likelihood' clause, requiring a burden of proof; and to add subversion and secession offences.[15] This last addition was the most problematic part of the bill, with the others seen as steps towards protection. The subversion and secession legislation would make it illegal to threaten the presence and stability of the People's Republic of China (PRC) under laws handling treason and war, and also used vague and undefined terms that left the legal threshold for prosecution unclear.[15]
Though the bill had been introduced in February 2003, major protest towards it did not happen for several months, as Asia was experiencing the SARS epidemic. In June, as the city had recovered, the pro-democracy camp mobilised the public to oppose the bill, and on 1 July, the sixth anniversary of the handover, more than a half million Hong Kong residents took to the streets against Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and Secretary for Security Regina Ip, who was in charge of the bill. In the evening of 6 July, Liberal Party chairman James Tien decided to withdraw from the "governing coalition" by resigning from the Executive Council in protest. Knowing that the bill would not be passed without the Liberal Party, the government finally decided to postpone it, before it was shelved indefinitely.[19]
| 2003 National Security Bill | 2020 National Security Law | |
|---|---|---|
| Procedure of enactment | Government released consultation document and went through local consultations. Debated and scrutinised in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Government offered modifications after backlash. |
Passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, pursuant to NPC authorisation. No widespread consultation or release of contents prior to passage. |
| Police search powers without a court warrant | Authorised under the initial bill, removed by the government as a concession. | Authorised. |
| Definition of the crime of secession | The use of "force or serious criminal means" that "seriously endangers the stability" of China or engaging in war is necessary to constitute secession. | Secession includes acts "whether or not by force or threat of force". |
| Actors subject to the law | Subversion and secession are limited to Hong Kong permanent residents, and treason to Chinese nationals regardless of where the crime was committed. | Covers anyone in Hong Kong regardless of nationality or residency status, and also applies to offences committed from outside Hong Kong by a person who is not a permanent resident. |
| Jurisdiction for prosecution | Hong Kong government and courts retain jurisdiction. | The central government's Office for Safeguarding National Security and the Supreme People's Court may exercise jurisdiction in certain circumstances. |
2010s
Pro-Beijing Hong Kong politicians have spoken about the proposed law since independence movements grew in Hong Kong. When China announced that " will absolutely neither permit anyone advocating secession in Hong Kong nor allow any pro-independence activists to enter a government institution", Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said Hong Kong would enact a security law targeting pro-independence movement in Hong Kong.[24] In 2018 Wang Zhimin, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, urged the Hong Kong government to enact national security legislation as he said "Hong Kong is the only place in the world without a national security legislation – it's a major weakness in the nation's overall security, and it has a direct impact on residents".[25]
Prelude to legislation
| 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests |
|---|
 |
When I reported in 1997 on the Hong Kong celebrations bidding farewell to British rule, there was one question on all lips. It was: how long would Beijing's 50-year pledge of "one nation, two systems" survive? The guesses were five years, perhaps 10. China would surely milk the cash cow for all it was worth, but any sign of trouble and Beijing would instantly wipe this "imperialist pimple" off the map. No one dreamed China's patience would last 23 years.
In 2019, the Hong Kong government introduced an extradition law amendment bill proposing to allow extradition to countries and territories that have no formal extradition agreements with Hong Kong, including Taiwan and Mainland China, in certain circumstances.[27]
The bill sparked continuing protests, and was later withdrawn.[28] The Chinese authorities attributed the instability to failing to exert critical influence over local affairs.[29] The South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese central government believed that the political climate in Hong Kong, due to the protests, precludes the passage of national security legislation under Article 23, while Chief Executive Carrie Lam added that the protests made the law more necessary than before, and so China resorted to enactment of security measures through the National People's Congress (NPC) instead.[30][31] On 15 April, the head of the liaison office in Hong Kong, Luo Huining, called for the rapid passing of a national security law for the city.[32]
On 18 June 2020, the Chinese government introduced a draft to the NPC, aiming for the session to take three days. This is a much more rapid process than bills in the NPC, which go through three different rounds of approval.[33]
NPCSC decision
On 22 May 2020, the NPC approved a decision to authorise the NPCSC to enact a national security law for Hong Kong if Hong Kong did not "legislate national security law according to the Basic Law as soon as possible".[34][35]
The decision authorises the NPCSC to enact laws for "a sound legal system" in the territory.[30][36] An NPCSC deputy claims that the Article 23 legislative provisions still have to be passed by August 2021.[37]
Initial responses and analyses
Analysis of Chinese government involvement
.jpg)
Brian Fong, a political analyst in Hong Kong-Mainland Chinese relations, explains that the move is a dramatic change in Chinese policy, and a risky one that could lead to Beijing "losing access to foreign capital and technology through Hong Kong".[39]
The American diplomat of Asian affairs Daniel R. Russel wrote in The Diplomat on 3 June 2020 that China was "fully aware of both the local and the international reaction it could expect" when the NPC passed its decision about the legislation.[38] Russel explained that the reaction in 2003, the 2019 protests, and some US sanctions favouring Hong Kong over Mainland China set the baseline for response to the decision. He also noted that China's reputation was already low internationally because of the COVID-19 pandemic (noting that, "ironically", it was in the same position as in 2003 with SARS and the legislation), especially in the US where "public attitudes toward the other nation have taken a sharp turn for the worse" because of the pandemic that originated in China.[38] However, he added that Beijing had at the time an "increased level of resolve tolerance for negative consequences"; he wrote that forceful economic action from the US may prompt the Chinese government to retaliate with military action in Hong Kong, suggesting that both nations have a disregard for the territory if it can be used for benefit in their trade war and warning that "Hong Kong may be martyred in the process".[38]
On 9 June 2020, The Guardian's China specialists Tania Branigan and Lily Kuo published a report titled "How Hong Kong caught fire: the story of a radical uprising". In it, they wrote that "the nature of is as alarming as its content: it sets a precedent of Beijing forcing unpopular legislation on Hong Kong", in open defiance of the handover terms.[40] They also look at the approach of the law, explaining that Beijing has given "material security in place of political freedoms" to its people in Mainland China, and plans to do the same in Hong Kong because it sees all issues as purely economical and protests only escalating because of "troublemakers and hostile foreign powers".[40] In terms of how it is being executed, the pair assert that in 2020, "Beijing has abandoned any pretence of winning hearts and minds", instead using force to prevent democracy politicians and activists from having platforms, which Branigan and Kuo say is a plan to use fear to suppress Hong Kong, as "persuasion" has not worked.[40]
The Chinese government's legal basis for involvement comes from the Chinese constitution declaring Hong Kong part of China, and Article 18 of the Hong Kong Basic Law allowing for Chinese laws to be valid in Hong Kong if they are included in Annex III. Deutsche Welle expects that the NPCSC national security law will stand as a Chinese national law that applies to Hong Kong, as it will be added to Annex III; Dang Yuan wrote for Deutsche Welle that "Beijing wants to maintain the appearance of Hong Kong's autonomy and continues to insist that Hong Kong pass its 'own' corresponding law" in alignment with the NPCSC legislation.[41] Deutsche Welle wrote that China chose mid-2020 as the time to intervene with a restrictive law because of the likelihood of a democratic majority winning in the Hong Kong elections in September, meaning another Hong Kong attempt at a national security law would be unlikely.[41]
Hong Kong
A large number of Hong Kong residents opposed the Chinese government proposals. The prospect of any national security law has always been unpopular, but protesters in 2020 said that the new proposals "strikes at the heart of Hong Kong's civic political identity, its success as an international hub. But most of all it strikes at people's sense of belonging".[39] Some Hong Kong opponents of the law hope it will cause other countries to revoke their special treatment toward Hong Kong, which will in turn damage China's economy, using the Cantonese slang term lam chau to describe this.[39][40]
The Hong Kong Bar Association, the city's professional body representing its barristers, issued a statement saying that it was "gravely concerned with both the contents of the and the manner of its introduction." The statement noted that the law was enacted in a way that prevented the city's lawyers, judges, police and residents from understanding its contents in any way prior to its coming into force.[42][43] The Hong Kong politician Margaret Ng believes that the Chinese government has wanted to implement a national security law in Hong Kong under their terms for years, and are using the 2019 protests as an excuse, saying that "China has always found it difficult to accept the kind of freedom and restraint to power that Hong Kong has under a separate system".[39] Man-Kei Tam, the Hong Kong director of Amnesty International, described the Chinese legislation as "Orwellian".[44]
In light of the passing of the national security law on 30 June, prominent democracy activists Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Agnes Chow, and Jeffrey Ngo announced that they would be leaving Demosistō, which had been involved in lobbying in the US for the passing of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the suspension of the city's special trade status. Shortly afterward, Demosistō was disbanded and all operations were ceased.[45] Two other pro-independent groups announced that they had ended their operations in Hong Kong, fearing that they would be the targets of the new law.[46] Nathan Law fled the country shortly afterwards.[47] Adrian Brown from Al Jazeera observed the passing of the law created a chilling effect in the city. According to him, when his team began interviewing ordinary people about their opinions on the passing of the law, many of them declined to comment, a phenomenon which he perceived to be "unusual".[45]
Though the law was not retroactive, many Hong Kong people deleted pro-democracy social media posts and accounts, and asked journalists to destroy evidence of previous conversations.[48] Businesses participating in the yellow economy removed pro-democracy posters, Lennon Walls, and pro-democracy social media posts.
Already after the passage of the NPCSC decision on 22 May, Hong Kong citizens began looking for ways to emigrate and leave Hong Kong, feeling that the law would fundamentally damage their rights of expression and freedom. Ten times the usual number of web searches about emigration were recorded after the decision was announced.[49] Following the British announcement that it would open a route to British citizenship for Hong Kongers born under British rule, a spike in interest in properties in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada occurred.[50][51]
Reuters held a poll of local opinion towards the law, in June before it was implemented. The result showed that a majority of Hong Kongers opposed the law, with 49% strongly opposing it and 7% somewhat opposing it. About a third of Hong Kongers said they supported the law, with 27% strongly supporting it and 7% somewhat supporting it.[52] Reuters conducted another poll after the law was implemented in late August. Which showed that 60% of the respondents opposed the law and a little bit over 31% supported the law.[53] The Hong Kong Research Association interviewed 1,097 adult citizens by telephone on 2–5 July. 66% of the respondents support the National People's Congress Standing Committee's enactment of the "Hong Kong National Security Law" and its implementation in Hong Kong in Annex III of the Basic Law, while 31% do not support it; the survey also shows that 47% of the respondents believe The "Hong Kong National Security Law" has a positive impact on Hong Kong's prospects, 32% of the respondents have no impact, and 17% think it has a negative impact.[54]
The One Country Two Systems Research Institute, a pro-Beijing think tank, conducted a telephone sampling survey in May 2020 and interviewed 963 adult citizens in Hong Kong. The institution reported that to the question "Do you think Hong Kong is responsible for safeguarding the country's security?", 74% of those who answered "Responsible", 16.6% of "No responsibility", and 9.5% of "Don't know/difficult to tell".[55]
On 1 June, a pro-Beijing group claimed it had gathered more than 2.9 million signatures supporting the legislation, through a website and street booths. Around the same time, the heads of the governing council of Hong Kong's eight publicly funded universities jointly backed Beijing's plan to impose a national security law on the city, specifically "the introduction of legislation which prohibits criminal acts that threaten the existence of the state".[56]
Republic of China (Taiwan)
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen expressed her disappointment with the controversial law and announced that a special office for coordinating humanitarian assistance to the Hong Kong people would officially open on the first of July in response to the law's passage.[57][58][59] The Democratic Progressive Party warned that this was the end of the "one country, two systems" policy for Hong Kong and that Taiwanese people travelling to Hong Kong should take care.[60] The head of the Mainland Affairs Council Chen Ming-tong described the law as "a decree issued by the Celestial Empire to the people of the world" due to its impacts on people worldwide not just in Hong Kong.[61]
United Kingdom
Sure, handover promises to the UK were made but was not going to let some Western attachment to liberty trump loyalty to the motherland. Not on his watch. Enter the security law.
— Stephen McDonell, 30 June 2020[62]
The UK, of which Hong Kong is a former colony, encouraged China to back down on the security law per the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration: terms of the UK handing sovereignty of Hong Kong to China included allowing Hong Kong to maintain autonomy and its British-based form of governance.[63] British First Secretary and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Dominic Raab stated that China was violating the Joint Declaration in their attempts to pursue the law.[64] On 3 June, the Chinese government announced that they consider the Joint Declaration to have become void as soon as power was transferred in 1997.[63]
At the start of June 2020, Raab and former Foreign Secretaries called for a formation of a large international alliance to exert pressure on Beijing.[65][66]
The biannual 11 June 2020 UK Report on Hong Kong (covering the last six months of 2019) had Raab more firmly warn China against interference, as well as reiterating the UK's right to comment on Hong Kong. The report requests that China abstain from interfering in the September elections in Hong Kong, and accuses the Chinese government of torturing a former employee of the British Consulate in Hong Kong, Simon Cheng, who visited the Mainland when working at the British Consulate in Hong Kong.[67] Six days later, the UK said that a new human rights law, which has been stalled in Whitehall for several months, could be used to "sanction Chinese officials if Beijing presses ahead" with the national security law.[68] The British law is to be a form of Magnitsky legislation, for the government to sanction those who commit acts repressing human rights.[68]
The 10 June 2021 semiannual report (covering the last six months of 2020) stated that Beijing had used the national security law in that period to "drastically curtail" free speech and to "stifle political opposition". It further raised concerns about "increasing pressure" on foreign judges. A spokesperson of the Hong Kong government said in response that the report was "inaccurate", a "smearing" of the national security law, and "adopting double standards".[69]
Extending Hong Kong British national rights
.jpg)
In late May and early June 2020, members of the British Cabinet also announced measures to provide a route to British citizenship for 3 million Hong Kong residents.[70] On 3 June, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that if China were to continue pursuing the law, he would allow Hong Kong residents to claim a British National (Overseas) (BNO) passport and open a path to British citizenship for them. Raab said that the UK would sacrifice trade deals with China to support Hong Kong.[64]
Raab delivered a proposal on right of abode legislation to the House of Commons on 2 June.[70] His measure planned to allow BNO passport holders to apply for a visa,[31] remain in the UK for an initial period of twelve months instead of six as previously, allow them to apply to study and work, and thereby provide them a path to citizenship.[71] Further to this proposal, Johnson's 3 June announcement would cover all of the approximately 3 million Hong Kong residents born before 1997.[63]
The extent of the scheme was clarified on 12 June 2020 by Home Secretary Priti Patel in correspondence with Johnson. All people eligible for BNO status, as well as their dependents, would be allowed to enter the UK under the scheme. This extent was still criticised for leaving a gap of young adults born after 1997 who were no longer dependents of a BNO and thus would not be able to access the scheme. She added that Hong Kong residents could start to come to the UK without restrictions while the scheme was still being set up, if the national security law were passed.[68]
On 1 July, Johnson announced the full plans. BNOs and their dependents will be able to apply for a visa allowing them to remain in the UK for five years, including being free to work and study. After five years they can, under normal British nationality law, apply for settled status and then, a year later, for citizenship.[72][73] Applications for the BNO visa were set to open on 31 January 2021.[74]
Other countries
The UK held a teleconference with its allies in the Five Eyes alliance (the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in the first few days of June, where they discussed the Hong Kong situation and requested that should the BNO extension go ahead, the other countries would share the burden of taking in Hong Kongers in the resulting exodus. Foreign ministers from the Five Eyes members and Commonwealth realms of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK jointly wrote a letter to the United Nations requesting "a new special envoy to monitor the impact of the law on Hong Kong", especially noting the Chinese security law proposal came in the week of the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.[75] Following persuasion from the UK, all members of the G7, notably including Japan, signed an official statement both urging China to reconsider the national security law and expressing concerns about human rights in Hong Kong on 17 June 2020.[68]
Australiaedit
Australia, with strong ties to Hong Kong, notably delayed action[75] until 9 July, when the country announced new visa and permit schemes for Hong Kongers to match the UK's offer.[76] That same day, the Australian Government suspended Australia's extradition agreement with Hong Kong.[77] In retaliation, China suspended its extradition agreement with Australia. Beijing also suspended its extradition agreements with the United Kingdom and Canada, which had suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong in response to the national security law.[78][79]
New Zealandedit
On 9 July, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters announced that New Zealand would review "the setting of its relationship" with Hong Kong in response to the introduction of the national security law.[80][81] On 28 July, New Zealand suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong on the grounds that it "eroded rule-of-law principles" and undermined the "one country, two systems" rule.[82][83] In retaliation, China severed its extradition agreement with New Zealand on 3 August.[84][85]
Japanedit
In Japan, Gen Nakatani, of the Liberal Democratic Party, and Shiori Yamao set up a nonpartisan group, on 29 July, with the aim of easing visa requirements for any Hong Kong citizens leaving the city due to the National Security Law, and making it easier for Hong Kongers to work and immigrate to Japan. It also urges the Japanese Government to not extradite any potential offenders of the National Security Law.[86][87] Under the provisions of the Extradition Act, the general framework for extradition by Japanese Law, political prisoners cannot be extradited to foreign countries, and offenders of the National Security Law are considered to fall under such status.[88][89]
United Statesedit
United States President Donald Trump declared that the administrative principle of ''One country, two systems,'' which acted to guide Hong Kong policy as separate from Mainland China, was no longer in effect, and issued Executive Order 13936, which terminated Hong Kong's special trade status with the United States. US Congress passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which in August 2020 issued sanctions on several Hong Kong officials deemed responsible for ''undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong,'' via the National Security Law, including Chief Executive Carrie Lam. Citing human rights concerns, it cancelled its extradition treaty and suspended cooperation on training police and military.[90] On 14 October 2020, the United States Department of State released a report on 10 individuals who it deemed to have "materially" contributed in the past or present to "the failure of China to meet its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong's Basic Law", or attempted to do so. Xia Baolong, Zhang Xiaoming, Luo Huining, Carrie Lam, Teresa Cheng, Erick Tsang, Zheng Yanxiong, Eric Chan, John Lee, and Chris Tang were on the list.[91] Four more officials were sanctioned by the Department of State on 9 November, including Edwina Lau Chi-wai, head of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security; and Li Jiangzhou, deputy director of the Hong Kong Office for Safeguarding National Security.[92][93] On 7 December 14 vice chairs of the NPCSC were sanctioned by freezing any US assets and barring travel to the United States,[94] a move which China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying strongly condemned on 8 December at a regular press briefing as "vile intention to grossly interfere in internal affairs".[95]
Irelandedit
Ireland announced that from 23 October 2020, the extradition treaty to Hong Kong will be suspended due to the implementation of the NSL.[96]
Business communityedit
On 3 June, the banks HSBC and Standard Chartered gave their backing to the law. HSBC made a post stating the company "respects and supports all laws that stabilise Hong Kong's social order". Standard Chartered stated they believe the law can "help maintain the long-term economic and social stability of Hong Kong".[97] In response, British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab criticised HSBC's statements, saying "ultimately businesses will make their own judgement calls, but let me just put it this way, we will not sacrifice the people of Hong Kong over the altar of banker bonuses".[98]
Over 61% of the responses in a business community survey said that the law would either have a positive or no impact at all on their businesses over the long term, according to the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. Some 54% viewed the law as "controversial", with the threat of foreign sanctions being seen as their biggest concern, though only affecting business in the short term.[99]
Educational communityedit
Following the implementation of the national security law Oxford University, along with a number of other universities, took measures to protect their students and faculty from it. Recording of classes was prohibited, work was anonymised, and small group tutorials were replaced with one-on-one meetings with faculty.[100]
In 2021, SOAS University of London warned students and faculty that they could face arrest and prosecution if they brought copies of their lecture notes to Hong Kong or mainland China in either physical or electronic form.[101]
Political analysis of British and international responsesedit
.jpg)
Johnson had previously voiced support for Hong Kong autonomy against the proposed extradition bill that incited the protests in 2019.[103] Johnson is seen as taking a more forceful approach to Hong Kong autonomy than former Prime Minister David Cameron; The Guardian's diplomatic editor Patrick Wintour wrote on 3 June 2020 that Cameron had been scared of the public perception of an influx of Hong Kong nationals to the UK in 2015 (when he encouraged China to allow Hong Kong to elect its leader without Beijing interference but went no further), while Johnson's hard stance to allow such mass migration is seen as a risk worth taking because it would also fundamentally undermine China's economy.[104]
Wintour and Guardian journalist Helen Davidson suggested that the ambiguity and possible conflicting statements on the number of Hong Kong residents the BNO measures will be extended to could reflect several things. One reason may be differences in opinion within the Cabinet, but Wintour and Davidson also write that it may be a tactic "to leave China guessing about the potential scale of a British-enabled brain drain from Hong Kong, if Beijing seeks to suppress human rights in the territory".[70]
The director of Hong Kong Watch, a human rights NGO, Johnny Patterson, felt that Johnson's announcement was "a watershed moment in Sino-British relations because no sitting PM has made a statement as bold as this on Hong Kong since the handover".[70] Patterson added that it shows "the severity of the situation on the ground and the fact that the British government genuinely, and rightly, feel a sense of duty to citizens of Hong Kong and are going to do all they can to stop them becoming the collateral damage of escalating geopolitical tensions".[70]
Davidson and Guardian Australia journalist Daniel Hurst note that despite powerful political calls in the country, and a precedent of good relations with Hong Kong and helping evacuate Chinese people in times of emergency, Morrison had a detached approach to the issue of welcoming fleeing Hong Kongers. They said Australia was "issuing statements of concern jointly with likeminded countries including the US, the UK and Canada, rather than speaking out on its own", and said this was because Australia had recently strained its relations with China when it was early to call for an inquiry related to the spread of COVID-19.[75]
Japan, which signed a statement with the G7 condemning China in relation to imposition of the law on 17 June, is typically neutral to Chinese politics. Wintour suggested that Japan decided to add their voice to the international dissent because of "a growing Japanese perception of the technological threat to Japanese security posed by China".[68] Shinzo Abe said that he wanted Japan to take the lead on the G7's statement, an announcement that drew criticism from China.[68]
In the wake of the new security law implemented in Hong Kong by China, the United Kingdom suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong on 20 July 2020. The UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab suggested that the revocation of extradition treaty will prevent its misuse.[105]
South Korea has not taken a clear position for or against the national security law. Experts believe that outright support for China on these issues would damage South Korea's vital diplomatic relationship with the US and would also run counter to South Korea's pro-democracy views.[106] At the same time, vocally opposing China would risk damaging South Korea economically, since China is their most prominent trading partner and had already placed informal sanctions on South Korea in the past regarding their participation in the US-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence programme announced in July 2016.[107][108]
Legislationedit
Initial plansedit
...the full text of the law doesn't really matter: the national security law is not an end in itself but a means for China to bring Hong Kong to heel. The law means whatever Beijing wants it to mean...
Text je dostupný za podmienok Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License 3.0 Unported; prípadne za ďalších podmienok. Podrobnejšie informácie nájdete na stránke Podmienky použitia.
Antropológia
Aplikované vedy
Bibliometria
Dejiny vedy
Encyklopédie
Filozofia vedy
Forenzné vedy
Humanitné vedy
Knižničná veda
Kryogenika
Kryptológia
Kulturológia
Literárna veda
Medzidisciplinárne oblasti
Metódy kvantitatívnej analýzy
Metavedy
Metodika
Text je dostupný za podmienok Creative
Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License 3.0 Unported; prípadne za ďalších
podmienok.
Podrobnejšie informácie nájdete na stránke Podmienky
použitia.
www.astronomia.sk | www.biologia.sk | www.botanika.sk | www.dejiny.sk | www.economy.sk | www.elektrotechnika.sk | www.estetika.sk | www.farmakologia.sk | www.filozofia.sk | Fyzika | www.futurologia.sk | www.genetika.sk | www.chemia.sk | www.lingvistika.sk | www.politologia.sk | www.psychologia.sk | www.sexuologia.sk | www.sociologia.sk | www.veda.sk I www.zoologia.sk