Appeal to nature - Biblioteka.sk

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Appeal to nature
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An appeal to nature is a rhetorical technique for presenting and proposing the argument that "a thing is good because it is 'natural', or bad because it is 'unnatural'."[1] In debate and discussion, an appeal-to-nature argument can considered to be a bad argument, because the implicit primary premise "What is natural is good" has no factual meaning beyond rhetoric in some or most contexts.

Forms

The following is a construction of the Appeal to Nature argument:

That which is natural is good or right.
N is natural.
Therefore, N is good or right.

That which is unnatural is bad or wrong.
U is unnatural.
Therefore, U is bad or wrong.[2]

In some contexts, the use of the terms of "nature" and "natural" can be vague, leading to unintended associations with other concepts. The word "natural" can also be a loaded term – much like the word "normal", in some contexts, it can carry an implicit value judgement. An appeal to nature would thus beg the question, because the conclusion is entailed by the premise.[2]

Opinions differ regarding appeal to nature in rational argument. By some more permissive views, it can sometimes be taken as a helpful rule of thumb in certain limited domains, even if it admits some exceptions. When such a principle is applied as a rule of thumb, natural facts are presumed to provide reliable value judgments regarding what is good, barring evidence to the contrary, and likewise for unnatural facts providing reliable value judgments regarding what is bad. Within a limited domain, treating a rule of thumb such as "all else being equal, you should generally try to eat natural foods" as if it is an exceptionless principle can sometimes involve a fallacy of accident.[2][3]

Julian Baggini explains the standard view of what makes this a fallacy as follows: "Even if we can agree that some things are natural and some are not, what follows from this? The answer is: nothing. There is no factual reason to suppose that what is natural is good (or at least better) and what is unnatural is bad (or at least worse)."[4]

History

The meaning and importance of various understandings and concepts of "nature" has been a persistent topic of discussion historically in both science and philosophy. In Ancient Greece, "the laws of nature were regarded not as generalized descriptions of what actually happens in the natural world… but rather as norms that people ought to follow… Thus the appeal to nature tended to mean an appeal to the nature of man treated as a source for norms of conduct. To Greeks this… represented a conscious probing and exploration into an area wherein, according to their whole tradition of thought, lay the true source for norms of conduct."[5]

In modern times, philosophers have challenged the notion that human beings' status as natural beings should determine or dictate their normative being. For example, Rousseau famously suggested that "We do not know what our nature permits us to be."[6] More recently, Nikolas Kompridis has applied Rousseau's axiom to debates about genetic intervention (or other kinds of intervention) into the biological basis of human life, writing:

here is a domain of human freedom not dictated by our biological nature, but is somewhat unnerving because it leaves uncomfortably open what kind of beings human beings could become… Put another way: What are we prepared to permit our nature to be? And on what basis should we give our permission?[7]

Kompridis writes that the naturalistic view of living things, articulated by one scientist as that of "machines whose components are biochemicals"[8] (Rodney Brooks), threatens to make a single normative understanding of human being the only possible understanding. He writes, "When we regard ourselves as 'machines whose components are biochemicals,' we not only presume to know what our nature permits us to be, but also that this knowledge permits us to answer the question of what is to become of us… This is not a question we were meant to answer, but, rather, a question to which we must remain answerable."[7]

Examples

Supermarket shelf with four different brands advertising themselves, in some form, as "natural"

Some popular examples of the appeal to nature can be found on labels and advertisements for food, clothing, alternative herbal remedies, and many other areas.[4][9] Labels may use the phrase "all-natural", to imply that products are environmentally friendly and safe. However, whether or not a product is "natural" is irrelevant, in itself, in determining its safety or effectiveness.[4][10] For example, many dangerous poisons are compounds that are found in nature.

It is also common practice for medicine to be brought up as an appeal to nature, stating that medicine is "unnatural" and therefore should not be used.[9] This is particularly notable as an argument employed against the practice of vaccination.[11]

On the topic of meat consumption, Peter Singer argues that it is fallacious to say that eating meat is morally acceptable simply because it is part of the "natural way", as the way that humans and other animals do behave naturally has no bearing on how we should behave. Thus, Singer claims, the moral permissibility or impermissibility of eating meat must be assessed on its own merits, not by appealing to what is "natural".[12]

Appeals to human nature in the enhancement debate

The contemporary debate between so-called “bioconservatives” and “transhumanists” is directly related to the concept of human nature: transhumanists argue that "current human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods."[13] Bioconservatives believe that the costs outweigh the benefits: in particular, they present their position as a defense of human nature which, according to them, is threatened by human enhancement technologies. Although this debate is mainly of an ethical kind, it is deeply rooted in the different interpretations of human nature, human freedom, and human dignity (which, according to bioconservatives, is specific to human beings, while transhumanists think that it can be possessed also by posthumans). As explained by Allen Buchanan,[14] the literature against human enhancement is characterized by two main concerns: that "enhancement may alter human nature" and that if this happens, it may "undercut our ability to ascertain the good, because, for us, the good is determined by our nature."[15][a]

Essentialist accounts

Prominent scholars with works that may be considered paradigmatically "bioconservative" include Jürgen Habermas,[17] Leon Kass,[18] Francis Fukuyama,[19] and Bill McKibben.[13] Some of the reasons why they oppose (certain forms of) human enhancement technology are to be found in the worry that such technology would be “dehumanizing” (as they would undermine the human dignity intrinsically built in our human nature). For instance, they fear that becoming “posthumans” could pose a threat to “ordinary” humans[20] or be harmful to posthumans themselves.[21][13]

Jürgen Habermas makes the argument against the specific case of genetic modification of unborn children by their parents, referred to as “eugenic programming” by Habermas. His argument is two-folded: The most immediate threat is on the “ethical freedom” of programmed individuals, and the subsequent threat is on the viability of liberal democracy. Reasoning of the former can be formulated as the following: Genetic programming of desirable traits, capabilities and dispositions puts restrictions on a person's freedom to choose a life of his own, to be the sole author of his existence. A genetically programmed child may feel alienated from his identity, which is now irreversibly co-written by human agents other than himself. This feeling of alienation, resulted from “contingency of a life's beginning that is not at disposal,” makes it difficult for genetically-modified persons to perceive themselves as moral agents who can make ethical judgement freely and independently – that is, without any substantial or definitive interference from another agent. Habermas proposes a second threat – the undermining power of genetic programming on the viability of democracy. The basis of liberal democracy, Habermas rightfully claims, is the symmetrical and independent mutual recognition among free, equal and autonomous persons. Genetic programming jeopardizes this condition by irreversibly subjecting children to permanent dependence on their parents, thus depriving them of their perceived ability to be full citizens of the legal community. This fundamental modification to human relationship erodes the foundation of liberal democracy and puts its viability in danger.[22]

Anti-essentialist accounts

The most famous proponent of transhumanism, on the other hand, is Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom. According to Bostrom, "human enhancement technologies should be made widely available,"[13] as they would offer enormous potential for improving the lives of human beings, e.g. improving their intellectual and physical capacities, or protecting them from suffering, illnesses, aging, and physical and cognitive shortcomings.[13] In response to bioconservatives, transhumanists argue that expanding a person's "capability set" would, by definition, increase her freedom of choice, rather than reducing it.[13]

Allen Buchanan has questioned the overarching relevance of the concept of human nature to this debate. In "Human Nature and Enhancement", he argued that good but also bad characteristics are part of human nature, and that changing the "bad" ones does not necessarily imply that the "good" ones will be affected. Moreover, Buchanan argued that the way we evaluate the good is independent of human nature: in fact, we can "make coherent judgments about the defective aspects of human nature, and if those defects were readied this need not affect our ability to judge what is good".[14] Buchanan's conclusion is that the debate on the enhancement of human beings would be more fruitful if it was conducted without appealing to the concept of human nature.[14]

Tim Lewens presented a similar position: since the only notions of human nature which are compatible with biology offer "no ethical guidance in debates over enhancement", we should set the concept of human nature aside when debating about enhancement.[23] On the other hand, "folk", neo-Aristotelian conceptions of human nature (e.g. Kass' version of natural law) seem to have normative implications, but "have no basis in biological fact" whatsoever.[b]

Appeals to nature often fall foul of the naturalistic fallacy, whereby certain capacities or traits are considered morally 'good' in virtue of their naturalness at face value (i.e. as opposed to a genuine natura naturans). The fallacy was initially introduced by G. E. Moore in 1903, who challenged philosopher's attempts to define good reductively, in terms of natural properties (such as desirable). Reliance on 'the natural' as a justification for resisting enhancement is criticized on several grounds by transhumanists, against the bioconservative motivation to preserve or protect 'human nature'. For one, Nick Bostrom asserts that "had Mother Nature been a real parent, she would have been in jail for child abuse and murder".[25]

Mixed accounts of human nature in the enhancement debate

Gustave Moreau's Prometheus (1868)

"Humanity until this point has been a story of evolution for the survival genes Now we are entering a new phase of human evolution—evolution under reason—where human beings are masters of their destiny. Power has been transferred from nature to science."

Julian Savulescu[26][c]

The term directed evolution is used chiefly within the transhumanist community to refer to the idea of applying the principles of directed evolution and experimental evolution to the control of human evolution.[27] The concept has been described as the Holy Grail of transhumanism.[27]

Paradigmatically here, UCLA biophysicist and entrepreneur Gregory Stock – otherwise known for his best-selling books, some of which are expansive arguments in favor of a kind of new, liberal eugenics[28][29] – notes:

The human species is moving out of its childhood. It is time to acknowledge our growing powers and begin to take responsibility for them. We have no choice in this, for we have begun to play god in so many intimate realms of life that we could not turn back if we tried. Some, of course, believe we should stop our audacious incursions into the very fabric of human biology – at least until we can summon up more wisdom. But the way to find wisdom about our newfound capabilities is not by trying to deny them (and thereby relegating their exploration to outlaw nations and scientific renegades), but by using them judiciously, by carefully feeling our way forward, and yes, by making mistakes and learning from them.[30]

Stock even goes as far as positing that, in this spirit, "when we imagine Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, we are not incredulous or shocked by his act. It is too characteristically human."[31]

Relevant to discussions over its ideological impartiality, Riccardo Campa of the IEET wrote that "self-directed evolution" can be coupled with many different political, philosophical, and religious views.[32]. As such, it is comparable to techno-progressivism.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ One such case that will become relevant once the naturalistic fallacy is invoked more directly:

    The most threatening aspect of genetic manipulation, in Fukuyama's eyes, is the idea that when we change our genetic make-up we will also change the predispositions of our abilities to act ethically. Fukuyama looks upon ethics and morality as part of our human nature and, from this perspective, it would be dangerous to meddle with it. We would be tampering with the natural basis of ethics.[16]

  2. ^ More generally, he poses a kind of dilemma:

    The tendency to linger in debates over cloning and enhancement on what is ‘natural’ to humans should be abandoned It either constitutes an irrelevant preamble to the important question of which features of human reproduction should be preserved, or it constitutes an objectionable allusion to some mythical and morally loaded ‘human nature’ that might serve as an ethical yardstick in debates of this sort. [24]

  3. ^ On the same page he elaborates:

    We are lucky to have our biology. If evolution had gone another way, rational beings might not be. But we should not engage in biology worship. Our biology is not sacrosanct. We should change it to make our lives longer and better.

References

  1. ^ Edward Moore, George (1922). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 45.
  2. ^ a b c Curtis, Gary N. "Appeal to Nature". The Fallacy Files. Retrieved 12 April 2020.
  3. ^ Groarke, Leo (2008). "Fallacy Theory". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Informal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). Informal logic is sometimes presented as a theoretical alternative to formal logic. This kind of characterization may reflect early battles in philosophy departments which debated, sometimes with acrimony, whether informal logic should be considered "real" logic. Today, informal logic enjoys a more conciliatory relationship with formal logic. Its attempt to understand informal reasoning is usually (but not always) couched in natural language, but research in informal logic sometimes employs formal methods and it remains an open question whether the accounts of argument in which informal logic specializes can in principle be formalized.
  4. ^ a b c Baggini, Julian (2004). Making Sense: Philosophy Behind the Headlines. Oxford University Press. pp. 181–182. ISBN 978-0-19-280506-5.
  5. ^ Saunders, Jason Lewis (26 October 2008). "Western Philosophical Schools and Doctrines: Ancient and Medieval Schools: Sophists: Particular Doctrines: Theoretical issues.". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 27 May 2011. Retrieved 7 February 2011.
  6. ^ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On education, USA: Basic Books, 1979, p. 62.
  7. ^ a b Kompridis, Nikolas (2009). "Technology's Challenge to Democracy: What of the human?" (PDF). Parrhesia. 8: 20–33.
  8. ^ "The current scientific view of living things is that they are machines whose components are biochemicals." Rodney Brooks, "The relationship between matter and life", Nature 409 (2010), p. 410.
  9. ^ a b Meier, Brian P.; Dillard, Amanda J.; Lappas, Courtney M. (2019). "Naturally better? A review of the natural-is-better bias". Social and Personality Psychology Compass. 13 (8): e12494. doi:10.1111/spc3.12494. ISSN 1751-9004. S2CID 201321386.
  10. ^ Flew, Antony (1998). How to Think Straight: An Introduction to Critical Reasoning. Prometheus Books. ISBN 978-1-57392-239-5.
  11. ^ Gavura, Scott (13 February 2014). "False "balance" on influenza with an appeal to nature". Science-Based Medicine. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  12. ^ Singer, Peter (2011). Practical Ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 60–61. ISBN 978-0521707688. There would still be an error of reasoning in the assumption that because this process is natural it is right.
  13. ^ a b c d e f Bostrom, Nick (2005). "In Defense of Posthuman Dignity" (PDF). Bioethics. 19 (3): 202–14. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x. PMID 16167401.
  14. ^ a b c Buchanan, Allen (2009). "Human nature and enhancement". Bioethics. 23 (3): 141–150. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00633.x. PMID 19161567. S2CID 35039986.
  15. ^ Buchanan, Allen (2009). "Human nature and enhancement". Bioethics. 23 (3): 141–150. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00633.x. PMID 19161567. S2CID 35039986., pp.141-142
  16. ^ Laurens Landeweerd (2004) "Normative-descriptive and the Naturalistic Fallacy", Global Bioethics, 17:1, 17-23, doi:10.1080/11287462.2004.10800838, p.22
  17. ^ Habermas, Jürgen (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Translated by H. Beister, M. Pensky, and W. Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press. (Originally published as: Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).
  18. ^ Kass, Leon (2003). "Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection". The New Atlantis. 1.
  19. ^ Fukuyama, Francis (2002). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
  20. ^ G. Annas; L. Andrews; R. Isasi (2002). "Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations". American Journal of Law and Medicine. 28 (2–3): 162. doi:10.1017/S009885880001162X. PMID 12197461. S2CID 233430956.
  21. ^ Kass, Leon (2002). Life, Liberty, and Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. San Francisco: Encounter Books.
  22. ^ Habermas, Jürgen (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Translated by H. Beister, M. Pensky, and W. Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press. (Originally published as: Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001, pp. 60–66).
  23. ^ Lewens, Tim (2012). "Human Nature: The Very Idea". Philosophy & Technology. 25 (4): 459–474. doi:10.1007/s13347-012-0063-x. S2CID 145176095.
  24. ^ Lewens, Tim (2012). "Human Nature: The Very Idea". Philosophy & Technology. 25 (4): 459–474. doi:10.1007/s13347-012-0063-x. S2CID 145176095., p. 473
  25. ^ Bostrom, Nick (June 2005). "In Defense of Posthuman Dignity". Bioethics. 19 (3): 202–214. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x. ISSN 0269-9702. PMID 16167401.
  26. ^ Savulescu, Julian (2003). "Human-Animal Transgenesis and Chimeras Might Be an Expression of Our Humanity". Journal of Bioethics. 3 (3): 22–25. doi:10.1162/15265160360706462. PMID 14594475. S2CID 6914160.
  27. ^ a b Maxwell, Mehlman. "Will Directed Evolution Destroy Humanity, and If So, What Can We Do About It?" (PDF). 3 St. Louis U.J. Health L. & Pol'y 93, 96-97 (2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 December 2015.
  28. ^ Stock, Gregory (1993). Metaman: The Making of Humans and Machines into a Global Superorganism. New York: Simon and Schuster.
  29. ^ Stock, Gregory; Campbell, John (2000). Engineering the human germline: an exploration of the science and ethics of altering the genes we pass to our children. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN:13978-0195133028
  30. ^ Stock, Gregory (1999). Humans: Objects of conscious design. BBC.
  31. ^ Stock, Gregory (2002). Redesigning Humans: Our Inevitable Genetic Future. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p.2
  32. ^ Campa, Riccardo. "Toward a transhumanist politics". Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Retrieved 26 February 2015.

External links

Zdroj:https://en.wikipedia.org?pojem=Appeal_to_nature
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