A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | CH | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
| People's Liberation Army Rocket Force | |
|---|---|
| 中国人民解放军火箭军 | |
 Emblem of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force | |
| Active | 1 July 1966 |
| Country |  People's Republic of China |
| Allegiance |  Chinese Communist Party[1] |
| Type | Tactical and strategic missile force |
| Role | Strategic deterrence Second strike |
| Size | 120,000 active personnel |
| Part of |  People's Liberation Army |
| Headquarters | Qinghe, Haidian, Beijing, China |
| March | 火箭军进行曲 ("March of the Rocket Force") |
| Equipment | |
| Engagements | |
| Website | Official website |
| Commanders | |
| Commander | General Wang Houbin |
| Political Commissar | General Xu Xisheng |
| Chief of Staff | General Sun Jinming |
| Notable commanders | General Wei Fenghe |
| Insignia | |
| Flag |  |
| Badge |  |
| Sleeve badge |  |
| People's Liberation Army |
|---|
 |
| Executive departments |
| Staff |
| Services |
| Arms |
| Domestic troops |
| Special operations force |
| Military districts |
| History of the Chinese military |
| Military ranks of China |
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The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force,[a] formerly the Second Artillery Corps,[b] is the strategic and tactical missile force of the People's Republic of China. The PLARF is the 4th branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—both nuclear and conventional. The armed service branch was established on 1 July 1966 and made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984. The headquarters for operations is located at Qinghe, Beijing. The PLARF is under the direct command of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC).
The PLARF comprises approximately 120,000 personnel and six ballistic missile "Bases" (units at roughly corps or army group grade), plus 3 support Bases in charge of storage,[2] engineering, and training respectively. The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the five Theaters throughout China.[3][4] and each controls a number of brigades.[needs update]
The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016.[5][6] Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of Chinese ballistic-missile submarines will come under PLARF control.[7][8]
China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world. According to Pentagon estimates, this includes 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles, 200 to 300 conventional medium-range ballistic missiles and an unknown number of conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as 200-300 ground-launched cruise missiles. Many of these are extremely accurate, which would allow them to destroy targets even without nuclear warheads.[9] The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2023 that China has a stockpile of approximately 500 nuclear warheads.[10][11]
History
In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the General Staff.
China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. With the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense and nuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.
China made rapid progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a 32-month period, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, at Lop Nor, launched its first nuclear missile on October 27, 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. Deployment of the Dongfeng-1 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.
Gansu hosted a missile launching area.[12] China destroyed 9 U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.[13]
In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.
By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the Soviet Union and the western United States.
In 1981, China launched three satellites into space orbit from a single launch vehicle, indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Type 092 submarine SSBN (Xia-class) in 1981, and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the Julang-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-4).
In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.
In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.
The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.
The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.
In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3,000–5,000-kilometre (1,900–3,100 mi) long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province.[14] 47 News reported that the facility was likely located in the Taihang Mountains.[15]
The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014;[16] it likely entered service by October 2019.[17] It is believed to have atop speed of Mach 10, or 12,360 km/h (7,680 mph).[18]
Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.[citation needed] China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.[19]
US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimated that as of 2023 the number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States has expanded well over 200.[20]
In June 2021, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has found out that China is constructing new missile silo field in Gansu in western China. According to the satellite picture, 119 missile silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles are under construction near Yumen City.[21] In July, Federation Of American Scientists found out there are another 110 silos being built in Hami, Xinjiang. The two significant expansion projects include silos more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation of PLARF today.[22]
In July 2021, China tested globe-circling hypersonic missile including the unprecedented launch of a separate 2nd missile from the ultra-high-speed vehicle according to the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound. According to reporting by the Financial Times, this weapons system consists of two parts: a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).[23][24]
In July 2023, South China Morning Post reported that PLARF commander Li Yuchao and deputy commander Liu Guangbin were under the investigation of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission. Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, while Wang Houbin was appointed as the commander PLARF.[25] Additionally, Xu Xisheng was appointed as the political commissar.[26] Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin's expulsion has not been formally explained. There are rumors that they are being investigated for corruption or disclosing military secrets.[27][28] Furthermore, it was thought to be an odd decision to replace the Rocket Force commander with military personnel from outside the branch, and this led to concerns about the security, credibility, and integrity of the PLA as well as its participation in China's military tactics during the Taiwan Strait conflict.[29]
Missile ranges
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Chinese Conventional Strike Ranges as of 2022 -
Chinese Nuclear Ballistic Missile Strike Ranges as of 2022
Ranks
Officers
| Title | 上将 Shang jiang |
中将 Zhong jiang |
少将 Shao jiang |
大校 Da xiao |
上校 Shang xiao |
中校 Zhong xiao |
少校 Shao xiao |
上尉 Shang wei |
中尉 Zhong wei |
少尉 Shao wei |
学员 Xue yuan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equivalent translation | General | Lieutenant general | Major general | Senior colonel | Colonel | Lieutenant colonel | Major | Captain | First lieutenant | Second lieutenant | Officer cadet |
| Shoulder insignia | 
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Enlisted
| Rank group | 高级军士 Gao ji jun shi |
中级军士 Zhong ji jun shi |
初级军士 Chu ji jun shi |
义务兵 Yi wu bing | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Title | 一级军士长 Yi ji jun shi zhang |
二级军士长 Er ji jun shi zhang |
三级军士长 San ji jun shi zhang |
一级上士 Yī jí jūnshì |
二级上士 yi ji shang shi |
中士 shang shi |
下士 Xia shi |
上等兵 Shang deng bing |
列兵 Lie bing |
| Equivalent translation | Master sergeant first class | Master sergeant second class | Master sergeant third class | Sergeant First Class | Sergeant Second Class | Sergeant | Corporal | Private first class | Private |
| Shoulder insignia | 
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Active missiles
It is currently somewhat unclear as to whether the Chinese theater commands or the PLARF itself has operational control over the conventional ballistic missile units, though it seems likely that the PLARF acts in coordination with, but not taking orders from, the theater commands with regards to the use of conventional ballistic missiles, with control of nuclear weapons continuing to be exercised at the Central Military Commission level.[30]
| Missile | Chinese name | NATO name | Image | Est. Max Range | Estimated Launchers | Est. Nuclear Warheads | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) Chinese: 高超音速飞行器; pinyin: gāochāo yīnsù fēixíngqì | |||||||
| DF-ZF | "DF-ZF"[32] | None (WU-14) | 
|
1500+ km | ? | 0 | |
| Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Chinese: 洲际弹道导弹; pinyin: zhōujì dàndào dǎodàn | |||||||
| Dongfeng-41 | simplified Chinese: 东风-41; traditional Chinese: 東風-41 | CSS-20 | 
|
12,000–15,000 km | Mobile:36 Silo:330 building??[33] |
108 | |
| Dongfeng-31 | simplified Chinese: 东风-31; traditional Chinese: 東風-31 | CSS-10 | 
|
12,000 km | DF-31:6 DF-31A:24 DF-31AG:56 |
90 | |
| Dongfeng-5 | simplified Chinese: 东风-5; traditional Chinese: 東風-5 | CSS-4 | 
|
12,000–15,000 km | DF-5A:6 DF-5B:12 |
66 | |
| Dongfeng-4 | simplified Chinese: 东风-4; traditional Chinese: 東風-4 | CSS-3 | .png)
|
5,500 km | 6? | 0 | |
| Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) Chinese: 远程弹道导弹; pinyin: yuǎnchéng dàndào dǎodàn | |||||||
| Dongfeng-26 | simplified Chinese: 东风-26; traditional Chinese: 東風-26 | CSS-18 | 
|
5,000 km | 140+ | ||
| Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) Chinese: 中程弹道导弹; pinyin: zhōng chéng dàndào dǎodàn | |||||||
| Dongfeng-21 | simplified Chinese: 东风-21; traditional Chinese: 東風-21 | CSS-5 | 
|
1,500–1,770 km | DF-21A/E: 24 DF-21D: 30 |
24 | |
| Dongfeng-17 | simplified Chinese: 东风-17; traditional Chinese: 東風-17 | CSS-22 |
|
1,800–2,500 km | Zdroj:https://en.wikipedia.org?pojem=People's_Liberation_Army_Rocket_Force|||