A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | CH | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
| Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 | |||||||||
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| Part of the Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts, Cold War, and Bangladesh Liberation War | |||||||||
 First row: Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, the Cdr. of Pakistani Eastern Comnd., signing the documented Instrument of Surrender in Dacca in the presence of Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora (GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Comnd.). Surojit Sen of All India Radio is seen holding a microphone on the right. Second row (left to right): Vice Adm. N. Krishnan (FOC-in-C Eastern Naval Comnd.), Air Mshl. H.C. Dewan, (AOC-in-C Eastern Air Comnd.), Lt Gen. Sagat Singh (Cdr. IV Corps), Maj Gen. JFR Jacob (COS Eastern Comnd.) and Flt Lt Krishnamurthy (peering over Jacob‘s shoulder). | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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 Abdul Motaleb Malik  | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
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Indian Armed Forces: 825,000[11] – 860,000[12] Mukti Bahini: 180,000[13] |
Pakistan Armed Forces: 350,000[14] – 365,000[12] Razakars: 35,000[15] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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Neutral claims[15]
Indian claims Pakistani claims
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Neutral claims[15]
Indian claims Pakistani claims | ||||||||
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The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, also known as the third India-Pakistan war, was a military confrontation between India and Pakistan that occurred during the Bangladesh Liberation War in East Pakistan from 3 December 1971 until the Pakistani capitulation in Dhaka on 16 December 1971. The war began with Pakistan's Operation Chengiz Khan, consisting of preemptive aerial strikes on eight Indian air stations. The strikes led to India declaring war on Pakistan, marking their entry into the war for East Pakistan's independence, on the side of Bengali nationalist forces. India's entry expanded the existing conflict with Indian and Pakistani forces engaging on both the eastern and western fronts.[28] Thirteen days after the war started, India achieved a clear upper hand, and the Eastern Command of the Pakistan military signed the instrument of surrender[29] on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking the formation of East Pakistan as the new nation of Bangladesh. Approximately 93,000 Pakistani servicemen were taken prisoner by the Indian Army, which included 79,676 to 81,000 uniformed personnel of the Pakistan Armed Forces, including some Bengali soldiers who had remained loyal to Pakistan.[30][31] The remaining 10,324 to 12,500 prisoners were civilians, either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (Razakars).[32][33][30]
It is estimated that members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militias killed between 300,000 and 3,000,000 civilians in Bangladesh.[34][35][36][37] As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country to seek refuge in India.[38]
During the 1971 Bangladesh war for independence, members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militias called the Razakars raped between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangladeshi women and girls in a systematic campaign of genocidal rape.[39][40][41][42]
Background
The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis.[citation needed] The political tensions between East Bengal and West Pakistan had its origin in the creation of Pakistan as a result of the partition of India by the United Kingdom in 1947; the popular language movement in 1950; mass riots in East Bengal in 1964; and the mass protests in 1969. These led to the resignation of President Ayub Khan, who invited army chief General Yahya Khan to take over the central government.[43]: xxx The geographical distance between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was vast; East Pakistan lay over 1,600 kilometres (1,000 mi) away, which greatly hampered any attempt to integrate the Bengali and the Pakistani cultures.[44]: 13–14 [45]
To overcome the Bengali domination and prevent formation of the central government in Islamabad, the controversial One Unit programme established the two wings of East and West Pakistan. West Pakistanis' opposition to these efforts made it difficult to effectively govern both wings.[43]: xxx In 1969, President Yahya Khan announced the first general elections and disestablished the status of West Pakistan as a single province in 1970, in order to restore it to its original heterogeneous status comprising four provinces, as defined at the time of establishment of Pakistan in 1947.[46] In addition, there were religious and racial tensions between Bengalis and the multi-ethnic West Pakistanis, as Bengalis looked different from the dominant West Pakistanis.[47]
The East Pakistan's Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stressed his political position by presenting his Six Points and endorsing the Bengalis' right to govern.[43]: xxx The 1970 Pakistani general election, resulted in Awami League gaining 167 out of 169 seats for the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, and a near-absolute majority in the 313-seat National Assembly, while the vote in West Pakistan was mostly won by the socialist Pakistan Peoples Party.[48]: 686–687 The League's election success caused many West Pakistanis to fear that it would allow the Bengalis to draft the constitution based on the six-points and liberalism.[49]: xlv
To resolve the crisis, the Admiral Ahsan Mission was formed to provide recommendations. Its findings were met with favourable reviews from the political leaders of West Pakistan, with the exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party.[50]: 109–110
However, the military top brass vetoed the mission's proposal.[50]: 110 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto endorsed the veto,[50]: 110 and subsequently refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League called for general strikes in the country. President Yahya Khan postponed the inauguration of the National Assembly, causing disillusionment with the Awami League and their supporters throughout East Pakistan.[51] In reaction, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for general strikes that eventually shut down the government, and dissidents in the East began targeting the ethnic Bihari community, which largely supported West Pakistan.[52]
In early March 1971, approximately 300 Biharis were slaughtered in riots by Bengali mobs in Chittagong alone.[52] The Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its deployment of the military in East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated its military crackdown.[52] President Yahya Khan called on the military – which was overwhelmingly led by West Pakistanis – to suppress dissent in the East, after accepting the resignation of Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the chief of staff of the East-Pakistani military.[53][54]
Mass arrests of dissidents began and, after several days of strikes and non-cooperation, the Pakistani military, led by Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The government outlawed the Awami League, which forced many of its members and sympathisers into refuge in Eastern India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25/26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. Operation Searchlight, followed by Operation Barisal, attempted to kill the intellectual elite of the east.[55]
On 26 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman of the Pakistan Army declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[56][57][58]
In April, the exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles and Bengali officers in Pakistan's army, navy, and marines, defected to the rebellion after taking refuge in different parts of India. The Bangladesh Force, namely the Mukti Bahini, consisting of Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Oniyomito Bahini (Guerilla Force), was formed under the retired colonel Mohammad Ataul Gani Osmani.[59] There was also a meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Nixon in November 1971, where she rejected the US advice against intervening in the conflict.[60]
India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War
After the resignations of Admiral S.M. Ahsan and Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the media correspondents began airing reports of the Pakistani military's widespread genocide against their Bengali citizens,[61] particularly aimed at the minority Bengali Hindu population,[62][63][28] which led to approximately 10 million people seeking refuge in the neighbouring states of Eastern India.[62][61][64] The Indian government opened the East Pakistan–India border to allow the Bengali refugees to find safe shelter; the governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border.[65]: 23–24 The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees strained India's already overburdened economy.[63]
The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community for assistance, but failed to elicit any response, despite the External Affairs minister Swaran Singh meeting foreign ministers of other countries.[66] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 concluded that instead of taking in millions of refugees, it was economical to go to war against Pakistan, and expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan.[64] On 28 April 1971, the Union cabinet ordered the Chief of the Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw to "Go into East Pakistan".[67][68][69] Defected East Pakistan military officers and the elements of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) immediately started using the Indian refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas that were to be trained against Pakistan.[70]
By November 1971, the Indian military was providing direct fire against Pakistani troops and even made several incursions into Pakistani territory.[71]
Indian authorities also attempted to carry on psychological warfare and keep up the morale of comrades in East Pakistan. The Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangladesh Radio Centre), which had broadcast Major Rahman's independence declaration, was relocated from Kalurghat in East Pakistan to India after the transmission building was shelled by Pakistani Sabre jets on 30 March 1971. It resumed broadcasts on 3 April from Tripura, aided by the Indian Border Security Force. The clandestine station was finally shifted to Kolkata, where it was joined by a large number of Bangladeshi radio programmers, newscasters, poets, singers and journalists. Its jurisdiction was transferred to the provisional Bangladesh government-in-exile, and made its first broadcast on 25 May, the birth anniversary of poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (who would later be named Bangladesh's national poet). Among the Indian contributors to the radio station's nationalistic programmes was Salil Chowdhury. Akashvani Kolkata also actively took part in this effort.[72][73]
Objective
By the end of April 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had asked the Indian Chief of Army Staff Gen Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan.[74][75] According to Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset of monsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the army tanks were being refitted.[75] He offered his resignation, which Gandhi declined.[75] He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it; Gandhi accepted his conditions.[75][76] In reality, Gandhi was well aware of the difficulties of a hasty military action, but she needed to get the military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public opinion, which were critical of India's restraint.[69]
By mid July, India had settled on a plan of attack. The ground in the East would be drier by mid November, which would make a rapid offensive easier. By early to mid December, the Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, limiting China's ability to intervene.[77]
The news media's mood in Pakistan had turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and India when the Pakistani news media reported the complexity of the situation in the East, though the reactions from Pakistan's news media pundits were mixed.[78][79] By the end of September 1971, a propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within the government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers endorsing "Crush India" becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore; this soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan.[80] By October, other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[81]
From mid October to 20 November, the Indian army conducted multiple incursions into East Pakistani territory,[82] generally withdrawing to India after completing their mission. From 21 November, however, Indian forces with Mukti Bahini support entered East Pakistan and remained there in preparation for a formal war that India expected to launch on 6 December.[83]
An Indian-Pakistani war seemed inevitable. The Soviet Union reportedly warned Pakistan against the war, which they termed as "suicidal course for Pakistan's unity."[84]: part-3 Despite this warning, in November 1971, thousands of people led by conservative Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to "crush India".[85][86] On 23 November, President Yahya Khan declared a national state of emergency and told the country to prepare for war.[87] By the first week of December, the conservative print media outlets in the country had published jihad related materials to boost the recruitment in the military.[80]
Overview
Initiation
On the evening of 3 December, at about 17:35, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive strikes on eight Indian airfields,[88] including Agra, which was 480 kilometres (300 mi) from the border. At the time of the attack, the Taj Mahal had been camouflaged with lots of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap, because its marble glowed prominently in the moonlight.[89] These pre-emptive strikes, known as Operation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli Six-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967, which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew too few planes to inflict significant damage.[88][90]
In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India[91][92] and the Indian Air Force (IAF) responded with initial air strikes the same night. These expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning.[citation needed]
This air action marked the start of all-out war; Gandhi ordered the mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. This involved Indian forces in coordinated air, sea and land assaults. The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dacca, and on the western front to contain Pakistani forces.[93]
Ground operations
The Indian army was better equipped than the Pakistanis and enjoyed significant numerical superiority over them.[60]
Pakistan launched a ground offensive on the western front.[60] Major ground attacks were concentrated on the western border by the Pakistan Army but the Indian Army was successful in penetrating into Pakistani soil. It eventually made some quick and initial gains, including the capture of around 15,010 km2 (5,795 sq mi)[7][8] of Pakistani territory; this land gained by India in Azad Kashmir, Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill[9]
Casualties inflicted to Pakistan Army's I Corps, II Corps, and Pakistan Marines' Punjab detachment were very high, and many soldiers and marines perished due to lack of operational planning and lack of coordination within the marine-army formations against Indian Army's Southern and Western Commands.[94]: 82–93 By the time the war came to end, the army soldiers and marines were highly demoralised– both emotionally and psychologically– on the western front and had no will to put up a defensive fight against the approaching Indian Army soldiers.[95]: 1–2
Western Front
On 3 December, after the air strike carried out by the PAF, the 106 Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani forces under the command of Brig Mohammad Mumtaz Khan advanced towards the village of Hussainiwala with 2000 troops and artillery support. The Indian side had deployed one battalion, 15 Punjab, under the command of Lt Col Shastry comprising 900 soldiers with support from the IAF. The 15 Punjab could not hold the village and had to retreat on 4 December towards the fortress called Kaiser-i-Hind outside Hussainiwala. The Indian forces were eventually pushed from the fortress a well.[96][97][98] The Indian side suffered 125 casualties while the Pakistani forces lost 67 men.
Simultaneously, Pakistani forces began an offensive on Chhamb, similar to the offensive carried out during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. The Pakistani 23 Armoured Division under Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua pushed through the region held by the Indian 10 Division with superior equipment commanded by Maj Gen Jaswant Singh.[99] Till December 9, the Pakistani commander Maj Gen Janjua perished but the Pakistani forces were able to force the Indian units to retreat by 11 December. Pakistan retained the territory won in this battle after the Simla Agreement.[100][101]
On 4 December, a Pakistani unit from the 18 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen B. M. Mustafa headed by Brig. Tariq Mir and Brig Jahanzeb Abab advanced towards the Rajasthan town of Longewala. The town was held by an outnumbered Infantry Company under Major K. S. Chandapuri and few border guards but had heavy IAF support.[102] This company held several anti-tank guns, cannons and howitzers. The initial Pakistani armored advance was stalled by the Indian Anti-tank and Anti-Mech defenses from high ground and the Pakistani sappers were also pushed back by Indian small arm and artillery cannon fire.[103] The IAF 122 squadron under the command of Wing Cdr D. M. Conquest equipped with Hawker Hunter and HAL HF-24 Marut also bombed the Pakistani units.[104] By 7 December the Battle of Longewala was decisively won by India.
Pakistani I Corps attempted to cut Indian transport lines between Punjab and Jammu by advancing on the Shakargarh sector on December 6. Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan commanded two infantry and one armored division into battle.[105] The region was heavily reinforced by the Indian I Corps commanded by Lt Gen Khem Karan Singh holding three infantry divisions, two independent armored brigades and two artillery brigades.[106] The resultant battle raged till the end of the war on 16 December and recorded heavy losses on both sides. Despite being numerically superior than the Indian side, Pakistan failed at capturing the region and the Indian units pushed back and threatened Sialkot. The Battle of Basantar was deemed an Indian victory.[107]
Between 8 and 14 December, India captured an 800 sq Km stretch of the Karakoram range in the Northern region of Ladakh in the Battle of Turtuk under the command of Col Udai Singh.[108]
Eastern Front
When the conflict started, the war immediately took a decisive turn in favour of India and their Bengali rebel allies militarily and diplomatically.[60]
Before the formal beginning of hostilities on 3 December, on 23 November, the Indian Army conventionally penetrated the eastern fronts and crossed East Pakistan's borders to join their Bengali nationalist allies.[109]: 156 Contrary to the 1965 war, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan.[109]: 156 Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army's Eastern Command, led the full Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As the Indian Eastern Command attacked the Pakistan Eastern Command, IAF rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dacca airfield out of commission.[109]: 156 In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.[109]: 156
The Indian campaign's "blitzkrieg" techniques exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani positions and bypassed opposition; this resulted in a swift victory.[110]: 802 Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight and psychological panic spread in the Eastern Command's military leadership.[110]: 802 Subsequently, the Indian Army encircled Dacca and issued an ultimatum to surrender in "30-minutes" time window on 16 December 1971.[111] Upon hearing the ultimatum, the East-Pakistan government collapsed when the Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi (Cdr. of Eastern Command) and his deputy, V-Adm. M.S. Khan, surrendered without offering any resistance.[109] On 16 December 1971, Pakistan ultimately called for unilateral ceasefire and surrendered its entire four-tier military to the Indian Army – hence ending the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.[109]
On the ground, Pakistan suffered the most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded, while India had 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded.[18] The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced and this finally represented a major defeat for Pakistan.[18]
The Indian Army's improved performance following its defeat in the Sino-Indian War in 1962 boosted its morale and prestige.[112]
Navy NHQ staffers and commanders of the Pakistan Navy knew very well that unlike the 1965 war, the Navy was ill-prepared for the naval conflict with India.[113]: 65 The Pakistan Navy was in no condition to fight an offensive war in deep water against the Indian Navy, and neither was it in a condition to mount a serious defence against Indian Navy's seaborne encroachment.[114]: 75–76
In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy's Western Naval Command, under Vice admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully launched a surprise attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 4/5 December 1971 under the codename Trident.[citation needed] The naval attack involving the Soviet-built Osa-class missile boats sank the Pakistan Navy's destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz while PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged.[citation needed] Pakistani naval sources reported that about 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict.[114]: 85–87 Seeking to retaliate, the Pakistan Navy submarines hunted for the major Indian warships.[115] On 9 December 1971, Hangor sank INS Khukri, inflicting 194 Indian casualties, and this attack was the first submarine kill since World War II.[116]: 229 [117]
The sinking of INS Khukri was followed by another Indian attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 8/9 December 1971 under the codename Python.[citation needed] A squadron of Indian Navy's Osa missile boats approached the Karachi port and launched a series of Soviet-acquired Styx missiles, that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships, as well as foreign ships docked in Karachi.[118] The PAF did not attack the Indian Navy ships, and confusion remained the next day when the civilian pilots of Pakistan International, acting as reconnaissance war pilots, misidentified PNS Zulfiqar and the air force attacked its own warship, inflicting major damages and killing several officers on board.[119]
In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Nilakanta Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.[114]: 82–83 From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan, including Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.[120] Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank off the coast of Visakhapatnam, due to an internal explosion, though whether this was triggered by Indian depth charges, diving to avoid them or some other reason has never been established.[121][122]
Due to a high number of defections, the Navy relied on deploying the Pakistan Marines, led by Rear Admiral Leslie Mungavin, where they had to conduct riverine operations against the Indian Army, but they too suffered major losses, mainly due to their lack of understanding of expeditionary warfare and the wet terrain of East Pakistan.[citation needed]
_launches_an_Alize_aircraft_during_Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971.jpg)
The damage inflicted on the Pakistan Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the Pakistan Coast Guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels; and large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi –[123] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[124] Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dacca.[125] According to one Pakistani scholar, Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.[126]
Air operations
After the attempted pre-emptive attack, the PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the IAF continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF decreased day–by–day.[127][128] The IAF flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.[citation needed]
This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF's AHQ to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict in the liberation war in the East.[129] The PAF avoided making contacts with the Indian Navy after the latter raided the port of Karachi twice, but the PAF did retaliate by bombing Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that had attacked.[130]
In the east, No. 14 Squadron "Tail Choppers" was destroyed and its CO, Squadron Leader PQ Mehdi, was taken POW, putting Pakistan's air command in Dhaka out of commission. India thereby achieved total air superiority on the eastern front.[citation needed]
At the end of the war, PAF pilots made successful escapes from East Pakistan to neighbouring Burma; many PAF personnel had already left the East for Burma on their own before Dacca was overrun by the Indian military in December 1971.[131]
Indian attacks on Pakistan
As the Indian Army tightened its grip in East Pakistan, the IAF continued with its attacks against Pakistan as the campaign developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar, and close-support attacks by fighter jets, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by Canberras and An-12s, while Pakistan responded with similar night attacks with its B-57s and C-130s.[132]: 107–108
The PAF deployed its F-6s mainly on defensive combat air patrol missions over their own bases, leaving the PAF unable to conduct effective offensive operations.[132]: 107 The IAF's raids damaged one USAF and one UN aircraft in Dacca, while a RCAF DHC-4 Caribou was destroyed in Islamabad, along with the USAF's Beech U-8 owned by the US military's liaison chief Brigadier-General Chuck Yeager.[132]: 107 [133] Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against PAF forward air bases in Pakistan until the end of the war, and interdiction and close-support operations were maintained.[132]: 107–108
One of the most successful air raids by India into West Pakistan happened on 8 December 1971, when Indian Hunter aircraft from the Pathankot-based 20 Squadron, attacked the Pakistani base in Murid and destroyed 5 F-86 aircraft on the ground. This was confirmed by Pakistan's military historian, Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail, in his book In The Ring and on Its Feet: Pakistan Air Force in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.[134]
The PAF played a more limited role in the operations. They were reinforced by Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (whose identity remains unknown).[132]: 107 According to author Martin Bowman, "Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia."[132]: 112 The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing and reconnaissance.[132]: 107 The PAF, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the war.[132]: 107 Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight.[135]
India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in Pakistan, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840 at the respective fronts.[132]: 107 By the end of the war, India had lost 45 aircraft while Pakistan lost 75.[15]
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Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command
Officially, the Instrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command stationed in East Pakistan, was signed between the Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Command and Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, at the Ramna Race Course in Dacca at 16:31Hrs IST on 16 December 1971.[citation needed] There was a problem over who would represent the Bangladesh government, as the three Bangladeshi battalion commanders - Lt Cols Shafiullah, Khaled Musharraf and Ziaur Rahman - were located too far away to be airlifted on time. The responsibility fell on the only armed forces officer available, Gp Capt AK Khondkar, chief of the newly formed BAF.[136] As the surrender was accepted silently by Lieutenant-General Aurora, the surrounding crowds on the race course started shouting anti-Pakistan slogans, and there were reports of abuses aimed at the surrendering commanders of Pakistani military.[137] Indian officers and an Indian diplomat, MEA joint secretary for Pakistan AK Ray, had to form a human chain around Lt Gen Niazi to protect him from being lynched.[136]
Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the surrender on 16 December, and India claimed large gains of territory in Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war). The war confirmed the independence of Bangladesh.[132]: 107
Following the surrender, the Indian Army took approximately 90,000 Pakistani servicemen and their Bengali supporters as POWs, making it the largest surrender since World War II.[138] Initial counts recorded that approximately 79,676 war prisoners were uniformed personnel, and the overwhelming majority of the war prisoners were officers – most of them from the army and navy, while relatively small numbers were from the air force and marines; others in larger number were serving in paramilitary units.[139]
The remaining prisoners were civilians who were either family members of the military personnel or volunteers (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission and the POW Investigation Commission reports instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as given in the table below. Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.[140]